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1. Introduction 
Given the acceleration of the process of economic integration, international trade has paved the way 
for deeper international connections. And since global warming is indeed a global problem, "common 
but differentiated responsibilities" require all countries in the world to fulfill their obligations to tackle 
climate change. As Stern (2008) pointed out, the economic analysis of climate change must “be global, 
deal with long time horizons, have the economics of risk and uncertainty at center stage.” The discussion 
of unilateral climate policies has therefore gradually led to discussions about the role of bilateral and 
multilateral climate policies in international trade, and the strategic interaction of countries in climate 
negotiations (Falkner et al., 2010). Policymakers and economists around the world have long worried 
about how these international climate policy regimes will play out in light of the economic behaviours 
of different countries and international trade. 
Over the past few decades, integrated assessment models (IAMs) have been widely used for analyzing 
the climate issues involving the characterization i.e. study of international trade and the effects of climate 
policies in an open economy. Particularly literature adopting the multi-regional computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models stands out (Ochuodho et al., 2016; Li et al., 2019). However, one of the most 
salient issues is that IAMs cannot deal with deep uncertainty in the economic system (Pindyck, 2013). 
To tackle this, another strand of models, namely the environmental dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (hereafter E-DSGE) models, have been emerging in the environmental and climate 
economics. Markedly different from IAMs, E-DSGE models explicitly incorporate future uncertainty by 
introducing several kinds of stochastic shocks to the economy. In light of dynamic and stochastic 
behaviour under the E-DSGE model, we are able to not only evaluate the long-term effects of climate 
policies, but also focus on the interactions between climate policies and dynamic economic cycles 
(Fischer and Springborn, 2011). Following Angelopoulos et al., (2010), a large number of scholars have 
conducted a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between economic cycles and unilateral climate 
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policies while utilizing E-DSGE models (Doda, 2014).1 Yet most of their research only focused on the 
effects of unilateral climate policies in a single economy; so far, there has been relatively little work on 
the two-way impact mechanism of economic cycles and climate policy regimes in open economies. 
While the importance of assessing the relationship between international trade and climate policy is 
undisputed, the complex connections between them and economic uncertainty pose great challenges to 
the assessment. Furthermore, on the one hand, international climate policies will undoubtedly affect the 
international transmission of a country's economic cycle and international trade balance. On the other 
hand, a country's economic cycle and trade balance will determine the allocation of its emission 
reduction resources and the international flow of carbon dioxide emissions, thereby affecting the 
potential impact of climate policies. Under these circumstances, we establish an open economy E-DSGE 
model and attempt to analyze the interactions between international economic cycles and different 
international climate policy regimes. The results shed light on how countries choose and implement 
climate policies under certain economic cycles. However, climate policy measures have multiple 
international dimensions, which has led to the need for joint agreements to seriously consider multilateral 
environmental and trade issues. Besides taking into account the cross-border externalities of CO2 
emissions and the corresponding interest issues of public goods, a country's climate policy must also 
consider trade-related impacts with other countries (Schenker, and Bucher, 2010). Thus, the issue of 
strategic interaction between multilateral climate negotiations and climate policy arises when countries 
have the ability to choose their own climate policies. In this paper, the E-DSGE model is extended to a 
Ramsey setup, which makes it possible to analyze optimal climate policies while utilizing Ramsey 
optimal policy rules. Here, we attempt to explore the Ramsey rule for optimal strategic interaction of 
                                                 
1 All previous research can be methodologically divided into two categories according to the setting of nominal friction. 
The first category, appearing earlier, is the flexible prices model without considering nominal friction, in which the real 
business cycle models (RBC) are established on the E-DSGE models. See Fischer and Springborn (2011), Heutel (2012), 
Heutel and Fischer (2013), Lintunen and Vilmi (2013), Bosetti and Maffezzoli (2014) and Khan et al., (2019). Another 
category, appearing later, is the improving and modifying RBC framework, in which the nominal rigidities are added 
to the E-DSGE models through a new Keynesian framework. See Annicchiarico and Di Dio (2015), Xu et al., (2016), 
Annicchiarico et al., (2018), and Xiao et al., (2018). 
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climate policies between different countries. 
Ganelli and Tervala (2011) is the only closest predecessor of our research. They extended the E-DSGE 
to an open economy model by modeling symmetric economies, and analyzed the international 
transmission process of unilateral environmental policies. Compared to their models, our model has 
several distinct characteristics: heterogeneous production sectors, bilateral climate policies, asymmetric 
economies, and asymmetric stochastic shocks. First, we embed heterogeneous production sectors into 
our E-DSGE model, modelling energy sectors in detail. Establishing a model that contains inter-sectoral 
linkages very important for being able to understand the transmission mechanism of stochastic shocks 
in the economy (Dissou and Karnizova, 2016). A detailed description of different fossil fuel and 
renewable energy sectors can also reveal energy substitution effects under climate policies in more detail, 
while the imperfect substitution between different energy sources can be modelled by heterogeneous 
energy sectors--a step which previous E-DSGE literature has missed. The setting of unilateral climate 
policy is then replaced by bilateral climate policy in our E-DSGE model, allowing us to analyze the role 
of bilateral climate policies in shaping the transmission of international economic cycles. Moreover, 
based on the Ramsey policy method, bilateral climate policy allows us to discuss the strategic 
interactions between different countries on climate policies. We therefore model asymmetric economies 
instead of symmetric economies. The heterogeneity with respect to the countries’ production behaviors 
in our E-DSGE model can help us shed light on the internal causes of different economic behaviors and 
thus the effects of economic cycle transmission across countries in terms of short-term fluctuations and 
long-term general equilibrium. The last distinctive characteristic involves the different types of 
asymmetric stochastic shocks treated in our E-DSGE model. Based on this feature, we are not only able 
to analyze how the international economic cycle is transmitted in different economies, but also how the 
international cross-border spillover effects of climate policies are caused by the international 
transmission of asymmetric stochastic shocks in heterogeneous economies.  
With this E-DSGE model, we choose a typical climate policy tool-carbon emission trading market 
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and then calibrate it based on data from China and the EU while taking the following three questions 
into consideration: (1) How will the economic behaviours of different countries and international trade 
interact with different climate policy regimes? (2) How will a country's economic uncertainty spread 
through international trade and different climate policy regimes? (3) In the face of international business 
cycles, what are the optimal strategic interactions of climate policies between different countries?  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 presents the data 
and parameters, Section 4 presents the long term effects of China’s and EU’s carbon markets, Section 5 
presents the international economic dynamics under carbon markets and Ramsey climate policy, Section 
6 presents conclusions. 
2. The E-DSGE model 
Here we consider two countries: domestic country (marked by subscript H) and foreign country 
(marked by subscript F). The economic variables and parameters in foreign country are represented by 
a star superscript.2  Domestic production structures and foreign production structures are modeled 
asymmetrically to depict the different economic structure. The intermediate goods markets in home and 
foreign are all monopolistic competition, whose price rigidity comes from staggered price adjustment à 
la Calvo (1983). The final goods and the government bonds are mobile between countries. The 
framework of open economy E-DSGE model is shown in Figure 1. In what follows, the economic 
behavior in domestic country are specified and the differences in foreign will be clarified. 
============================== 
Figure 1 
============================== 
2.1 Household 
The domestic economy contains numerous homogenous families. The representative household is 
endowed with labor dedicated to different goods-producing firms. Notice that labor in every household 
is equivalent to homogeneous goods as the agent does not distinguish between different jobs. The 
                                                 
2 For example, *
,H tC  is foreign consumption of domestic goods and ,F tC  is domestic consumption of foreign goods. 
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representative infinitely lived household maximizes the following lifetime utility: 
31 2 11 1 1
( , , , , , )
0 1 2 3
[ ( ) ( ) ] [ / ]
{ }
1 1 1
H H
t t t t t t
t Lt t t t t
t t t
C L B D M K
t
Q C L M P
U E s s
   
 
  
  

  
  
            (1) 
in which the time preference shock ts

 and labour supply preference shock 
L
ts  all follow AR(1) 
stochastic process: 
1
2
, ,
ln ln ln ln ~ . . . (0, )
tt ts s s st s
s s s i i d Ns    
                        (2) 
,1
2
,
ln ln ln ln ~ . . . (0, )L L L L L
L L L L
t ts s s s st t
i i Ns s s s d                     (3) 
where U  is the utility of a representative family, tE  represents a conditional expectation based on the 
t period, tL  represents the labor supply, tM  is the domestic currency, tC  is a composite 
consumption index defined by 
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The purchasing power parity condition is satisfied by the following equations 
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where the import price 
,F tP  and domestic price ,H tP  for domestic country are all expressed by domestic 
currency and the import price 
*
,H tP  and foreign price 
*
,F tP  for foreign country are all expressed by 
foreign currency. tS  is the nominal exchange rate.  
The budget constraint in units of goods:  
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Under budget constraints, the household uses income to satisfy consumption, investment and bond 
acquisition. tI  is the investment, tB  and tD  is the domestic and foreign government bond, and they 
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sold at price B
tR  and 
D
tR , tK  is capital stock at renting price 
K
tR , 
L
t  and 
K
t  is the labor and 
capital tax rate, tP  is the overall price level, tW  is the nominal wage. 
The stock of capital follows the following law motion à la Christiano et al., (2005): 
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To solve the household problem, the Langrangian function was formed:3 
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2.2 Enterprises 
2.2.1 Final goods producers 
The representative final goods producer uses ( )tY j  units of each intermediate good [0,1]j  to 
produce the final good tY , according to the function proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), where 1   
is the elasticity of the substitution between the different intermediate goods.4 
1
1
1
0
[ ( ) ]t tY Y j dj
 
 

                              (10) 
2.2.2 Intermediate goods producers 
We disaggregated intermediate goods producers’ behaviours into four levels of the production 
nesting.5 The framework of the intermediate goods producers’ production is shown in Figure 2. 
============================== 
Figure 2 
============================== 
In the first layer, a firm that produces intermediate outputs purchases energy composite ( )tE j  at 
price E
tP , hires the labor ( )
Y
tL j  and rents the capital ( )
Y
tK j  to produce intermediate outputs ( )tY j  
                                                 
3 The F.O.C. for household can be found in Appendix 
4 The F.O.C for final goods producer can be found in Appendix 
5 Here we only provide the optimal behavior of those producing firms. The F.O.Cs of every level can be found in 
Appendix 
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by Cobb-Douglas function. and 
L
tη  is labor efficiency which is decided by the climate quality. The 
problem for representative intermediate goods producing firm can be written as follows: 
1 1 1 1
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The total factor productivity tA  is a stochastic shock follows AR(1) process. 
2
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In the second layer, energy producing firm purchase use fossil energy ( )tFE j  at price 
FE
tP  and 
renewable energy ( )tNE j  at price 
NE
tP  to produce energy composite by CES function. The energy 
producing firm’s problem can be written as follows: 
1/
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In the third layer, fossil energy producing firm purchase three different kinds of fossil fuels: coal
( )tM j  , oil ( )tO j  and natural gas ( )tNG j  at price 
M
tP  , 
O
tP  and 
NG
tP  to produce fossil energy 
composite by Cobb-Douglas function. 
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CO2 emissions 
2 ( )COtE j  are a by-product of fossil fuels. The emission coefficients of three fossil 
fuels are ,M O NGμ μ and μ . Also the representative enterprise can determine its proportions of emission 
reductions ,M O NGt t tre re and re  . 
2 ( ) [1 ( )] ( ) [1 ( )] ( ) [1 ( )] ( )CO M O NGt t M t t O t t NG tE j re j μ M j re j μ O j re j μ NG j             (15) 
The marginal abatement costs of coal, oil and natural gas ( , ,M O NGt t tMCE MCE MCE ) are functions of 
the proportion of emission reductions as follows.  
= ln(1 )M Mt M tMCE Λ re , = ln(1 )
O O
t O tMCE Λ re  and = ln(1 )
NG NG
t NG tMCE Λ re      (16) 
The fossil energy producing firm’s problem can be written as follows: 
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Renewable energy producing firm use labor ( )NEtL j  and capital ( )
NE
tK j  to produce renewable 
energy composite by Cobb-Douglas function. Meanwhile, it can also produce certified emission 
reduction ( )tCER j  and sell it at price 
CER
tP  to other firms to offset CO2 emissions. Since the supply 
of CERs is independent from the EU-ETS, which will impact the price stability, there is a ceiling on 
certified emission reduction.6 
3( ) ( )
ς
t tCER j NE j                                (18) 
The renewable energy producing firm’s problem can be written as follows: 
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In addition, the government can provide financial support for renewable producers ( )tTr j . It is 
proved that the R&D investment can increase the technology level. The relationship between the 
financial support ( )tTr j  and technology level ( )tTI j  can be expressed as the following non-
decreasing, though bounded, function (Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002): 
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In the fourth layer, coal, oil and natural gas producers hire labor ( )MtL j , ( )
O
tL j , ( )
NG
tL j  and rent 
capital ( )MtK j  , ( )
O
tK j  , ( )
NG
tK j  to produce coal, oil and natural gas products by Cobb-Douglas 
functions. The coal, oil and natural gas producing firm’s problem can be written as follows: 
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6 The use of CER is no more than 5% of total EU emissions 
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Following Calvo (1983), the probability of an intermediate firm change its nominal price during any 
given period is 1  . Representative firm will change its price to maximise the expected sum of 
discounted future real profits. 
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2.3 Climate quality and CO2 concentration 
The relationship between temperature rise ( tΔ ) since the pre-industrial age and concentrations of CO2 
in the atmosphere (
2,CO tC ) can be calculated as follows (Acemoglu et al., 2009): 
2,23log ( / 280)CO ttΔ C                               (26) 
The relationship between climate quality ( tQ ), temperature rise and tipping point of temperature for 
extreme disasters ( tp ) can be read as follows: 
2
/3
3log ( / 280)( )= 2 tpt tQ Q

                             (27) 
The cost from degradation of climate quality ( )tQ  can influence their utilities.  
1[ ( )] [ ( )]
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tp t tp tp t
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Q Q
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
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
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The evolution of climate quality: 
2 2*
1
/3
280 2(1 0.005) 0.005 ( )tp CO CO restt t t t t
Δ
Q Q E E E                   (29) 
The negative externality will decline the labor efficiency. Referring to Annicchiarico and Di Dio 
(2015), we adopt the following equation: 
2
0 1 21 ( )t
L
tt Q Q                                 (30) 
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2.4 Government and climate policy 
The domestic governments issue the money and domestic bonds, and levy taxes on labour and capital, 
and auction CO2 emission quota to intermediate producers to satisfy their public consumption tG  and 
financial support for renewable energy. They balance their budget by following behaviour:  
2 2
1 1 1 1
B L K K CO CO
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tPG R B Tr M W L R K P E B M                       (31) 
Fiscal policies aim to maintain economic stability by controlling government balance and output gap. 
The fiscal policy rules for tG , 
K
t  and 
L
t  are as follows: 
2
1 , ,ln ln ln ln (ln / ln / ) (ln ln ) ~ . . . (0, )
K K K K K K
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2
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L L L L L L
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2
1 , ,1 1ln ln ln ln (ln ln ) (ln ln ) ~ . . . (0, )
G G
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The governments in home and aboard can choose among different four possible climate policies. The 
baseline is all countries do not apply CO2 emission trading market (we name this case as “BAU”). If the 
emission trading market in each country is separate, the government in home and abroad should set their 
own emission target and auction the CO2 emission quotas. According to the clean development 
mechanism, developed countries can obtain certified emission reductions by supporting greenhouse gas 
emission reduction projects in developing countries, which can be used as an offset for CO2 emissions. 
So, we obtain 
2 2CO CO
tE E  and 
2* 2*CO CO
t tE E CER  . At this case, governments can choose to use 
the revenue from the CO2 quota auction as part of the public budget 
* 0t tTr Tr   (we name it as “SE”) 
or to support renewable energy 
2 2CO CO
t tTr P E  and 
* 2* 2*CO CO
t tTr P E  (we name it as “SER”). In 
addition, if there is joint emission trading market in home and aboard, the CO2 emission quota can be 
traded in foreign market. At this case, the equilibrium carbon prices are equal in home and foreign 
markets. 
2 2* 2 2*CO CO CO CO
t t tE E E E CER     is hold (we name it as “JE”). Also, the revenue from the 
CO2 quota auction can be used for supporting renewable energy in each country (we name it as “JER”).  
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3. Data and parameters 
After establishing the model, we calibrate the model for China and the EU. The domestic country 
marked by subscript H in above model represents China here, and the foreign country marked by 
subscript F represents the EU here. In this paper, calibration and mix frequency Bayesian estimation 
were used to get parameter values of China and the EU. 
Based on existing researches and relevant statistic data, those standard parameters related to household 
preference, labor elasticity and risk aversion etc., are determined by calibration method. With regards to 
the economic part of the model, we estimate the parameters of production structure in China and the EU 
using GTAP database. With regards to the climate-related parameters, we refer to integrated assessment 
models, for instance, we estimate the marginal abatement costs by our CGE models (Xiao et al., 2015; 
Xiao et al., 2017). Table 1 shows the specific source and estimation method of those parameters. 
============================== 
Table 1 
============================== 
For some deep structural parameters, Bayesian estimation method is a good tool to extract them from 
the real economy. China’s and EU’s quarterly GDP data from 2008 Q1 to 2018 Q4 were selected. We 
also selected monthly consumption, energy input and public expenditure data in China and EU and 
monthly exchange rate from January 2008 to December 2018. Due to the different frequencies of 
available data, we use the mix frequency Bayesian estimation method to unify the time frequency of all 
the observed variables and estimate the structural parameters of China and the EU. The time frequency 
is measured in months. Moreover, we use Census X12 method to deseasonalize them and one side 
Hodrick-Prescott filter to obtain the volatile components of the observed variables. Table 2 presents the 
results of mix frequency Bayesian estimation for those deep structural parameters. 
============================== 
Table 2 
============================== 
4. Long term effects of China’s and EU’s carbon markets 
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Table 3 shows the steady-state values of the main variables. We focus on the long-term equilibrium 
of variables. Therefore, we simulate the long-term emission reduction targets of China and the EU.7 In 
SE scenario, the emission caps are 90% and 62% in China and EU separately. The EU reduced its overall 
emissions by 33%, with the remaining 5% emission reduction offset by CER purchasing from outside. 
============================== 
Table 3 
============================== 
Notice that real output in China and the EU will decrease by 0.87% and 1.48% in SE scenario when 
they both apply separate emission trading market. There is no doubt that the emission trading market 
will reduce the economic level of China and the EU, but it will bring about environmental improvement. 
As two major CO2 emitters, the EU and China's 2030 emission reduction targets will result in a 3.64% 
reduction in atmospheric CO2 concentration. Due to differences in resource endowments, China and the 
EU have different ways to achieve emission reduction targets. In China, the coal industry will be most 
affected, followed by oil and gas. In the EU, however, the oil and gas industry has suffered far more than 
the coal industry. Although the mechanism of carbon market restraining economic activity has been 
analyzed by most literatures, the transmission mechanism of different carbon markets in open economy 
has been seldom analyzed. The results show that economic activity in both China and the EU has been 
suppressed, while the negative effects are quite different. This differences comes not just from different 
emission reduction targets, but from the impact of carbon markets on trade in open economies. Due to 
different emission reduction targets and the relative independence of carbon market in China and the EU, 
the production costs of domestic and foreign enterprises are different. This will lead to changes in the 
competitiveness of each country's goods in the international market. Under the current emission 
reduction target, China's emission reduction cost is lower than that of the EU, so the cost imposed on 
                                                 
7 The EU stated that by 2030, the emissions from the carbon market will be 43% lower than in 2005. Here we build 
the DSGE model based on 2010 data, so the emission reduction target is converted from the base period of 2005 to the 
base period of 2010. China has pledged to cut emissions intensity per unit of GDP by 60-65% by 2030 from 2005 levels. 
Since it is intensity reduction, it is impossible to know the specific reduction proportion. Here, we use the GDP growth 
rate to calculate the actual GDP in 2030, and then convert the emission reduction target into 2010. GDP growth rate is 
measured using a lower growth scenario, according to Oxford Economics' China economic forecast. 
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enterprises is also lower, which is conducive to the international competitiveness of Chinese goods in 
EU-China trade. The impact of different separate carbon markets on international trade is reflected in 
changes in the relative prices of goods. For example, in SE scenario, the relative devaluation of the euro 
has led to an increase in exports from the EU and a decrease in imports from China, which in turn has 
led to a larger decline in consumption in the EU. By contrast, the relative appreciation of currency in 
China lead to a small decline of China's overall consumption level, and increased external investments, 
which induce a smaller output decline than the EU. 
Comparing SE with SER scenario, we found that using the revenue from carbon quota auctions to 
subsidize renewable energy could offset some of the negative effects of the carbon market in China and 
the EU. When the government provides financial support for R&D investment of renewable producers, 
it will significantly promote the development of renewable energy. However, the degree to which R&D 
subsidies promote renewable energy varies widely. This is due to the high utilization rate of renewable 
energy and the low efficiency of subsidized research and development in the EU, resulting in a limited 
increase in technology level. In addition, the EU's carbon quota auction generates less revenue than 
China's, which also causes China's R&D investment to be higher than the EU's. 
In what follows, we consider that Chinese and EU’s carbon quotas can flow perfectly in both emission 
trading markets and the emission reduction target in joint carbon market is same as separate carbon 
market. For CO2 emissions, in the separate carbon market, the EU has a higher proportion of emission 
reduction target, so the marginal cost of emission reduction is higher, which is manifested in the fact that 
EU's equilibrium carbon price is higher than the China's equilibrium carbon price (when converted into 
the same currency). When carbon quota can flow perfectly in a joint carbon market, the EU with high 
marginal emission reduction cost can decrease its marginal abatement cost by buying carbon quotas from 
China with low emission reduction cost. Eventually, under the condition of meeting the emission 
reduction target, China will reduce emission by 15.55% and the EU by 13.91%. 
Since the separate carbon market will cause the inconsistency of equilibrium carbon price across the 
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countries, it provides space for border regulation tax, which also indirectly reflects that the efficiency of 
the separate carbon market is lower than that of the joint carbon market. To verify that, we compare the 
total welfare of China and the EU under SE scenario with the total welfare under JE scenario ( tTW  in 
Table 3). The results show that the total welfare under JE scenario is higher than that under SE scenario. 
We also noticed that the total real output under JE scenario is higher than that under SE scenario ( tTY  
in Table 3). Thus, separate carbon market can bring the loss of social welfare which can also be reflected 
in the total real output of China and the EU. Compared with SE scenario, in the JE scenario, as the EU's 
19% emission reduction will be achieved by purchasing quotas from China, China's emission reduction 
ratio increases, coupled with the devaluation of RMB, the output will decrease. 
We obtained the marginal abatement cost curve for the EU and China by continuously applying 
different emission limits. Figure 3(a) and 3(b) are the marginal emission reduction cost curves of the EU 
and China. To compare the marginal cost of reducing emissions, we explain the marginal abatement cost 
as a percentage of the country's overall price level as the y-axis (which can be deemed as a percentage 
of the price markup). Under the same emission reduction target, the marginal emission reduction cost of 
EU is higher than that of China. When we put two marginal abatement cost curves together, we can 
explain more intuitively that the efficiency of the joint carbon market is higher than that of the separate 
carbon market. In Figure 3(c), to unify the emission reduction ratio, the horizontal axis is the percentage 
of China’s and the EU’s emission reductions as a percentage of sum of total emissions from the EU and 
China. This figure perfectly replicates the results of SE scenario and JE scenario in Table 3. Equilibrium 
results of joint carbon market and separate market are marked by green and red dotted line separately. 
Shadow area in Figure 3(c) is the deadweight loss from separate carbon market, which is the loss of total 
welfare. 
============================== 
Figure 3 
============================== 
A joint carbon market could automatically reallocate countries' emissions reductions to minimize the 
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emission reduction cost. We simulate the optimal allocation of emission reductions ratio between China 
and the EU under different total emission reduction ratios. The results are shown in Figure 3(d). The 
combination of emission reduction ratios on this curve is optimal and the total cost of emission reduction 
is the minimum. For example, a combination of a 9% cut for China and an 8% cut for the EU can 
minimize the total abatement cost under the current total emission reduction target. The combination of 
emission reduction targets above the curve makes the EU pay extra abatement costs and reduces the 
competitiveness of EU goods in China-EU trade. Undoubtedly, this is good for China, but it will cause 
deadweight loss. It would be bad for international trade if the EU covered the extra costs by imposing 
carbon tariffs on imports.  
We notice that the curve is always below the 45-degree line, which shows that China needs to 
undertake more emission reductions in the optimal portfolio. Since China's emission reduction space is 
larger than the EU, the cost of abatement is lower than that of the EU, so it is understandable that China 
will bear more emission reductions. The difference between the curve and the 45-degree line is the 
additional emission reductions that China needs to bear. We found that although the curve is always 
below the 45-degree line, it is basically consistent with the 45-degree line. This shows that there are not 
many additional emission reduction parts that need to be undertaken by China (maximum only up to 5% 
of the EU emission reduction ratio). This is because China, as a responsible big country, has committed 
itself to reducing its carbon intensity target internationally. The marginal cost of emission reduction is 
also increasing year by year, and the cost gap with the EU is gradually narrowing. 
5. International economic dynamics and carbon markets 
5.1 Technology shock 
Figure 4 shows the responses to a transitory increase in TFP hitting only China. In response to a 
positive TFP shock on China, it is possible to see that China’s main macroeconomic variables positively 
react. The first is the positive and rapid response of China’s total output. As the marginal productivity of 
various factors of production rises, enterprises are induced to expand production. Therefore, the 
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investment follows positive “hump-shaped” dynamics à la Christiano et al., (2005). As expected and 
similar to most NK literatures, labor exhibits counter-cyclical dynamics in response to positive 
technological shocks. Nominal rigidity has a negative effect on the labor market. This result is also 
consistent with empirical researches, which shows the positive technological shocks lead to temporary 
declines in employment.  
============================== 
Figure 4 
============================== 
Looking the effects of asymmetric TFP shock on the EU, we found that the situation is more complex 
than that of a single country, and even more complex than previous homogeneous economic models. 
The EU’s economies are affected in two ways: first, the aggregate demand effect, and second, the 
competitiveness effect. The increase in the EU’s consumption and investment generates a higher demand 
for imports, which can push up the total EU’s demand. Meanwhile the technological progress at home 
leads to comparative competitive disadvantage abroad. A rising EU’s trade deficit has forced the RMB 
to appreciate in EU-China trade. At last, unfavorable terms of trade led to a small decline in the level of 
the EU’s economies. Different from Annicchiarico and Diluiso (2019), they studied the impact of 
heterogeneous TFP shocks on symmetric economies and concluded that positive domestic TFP growth 
leads to simultaneous domestic and foreign output growth. This paper considers asymmetric economies 
and portrays the actual economic situation of the two economies with the data of China and the EU. As 
a major exporter, China has always maintained a trade surplus in Sino-European trade. China's 
technological progress will significantly reduce the competitiveness of goods of the EU, thus 
exacerbating the trade deficit between the EU and China. The increased trade deficit will directly damage 
manufacturing and employment opportunities, and will have a contraction effect on EU’s output. 
In what follows we look how the different climate policies can influence the international business 
cycle. Generally speaking, under different climate policies, there is not much difference in the response 
of major China’s macroeconomic variables. Positive effects of China’s output is magnified when there 
is no climate policy, because enterprises do not have to bear the costs associated with the CO2 emissions, 
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and they are allowed to emit more. Meanwhile, due to the decline in the EU’s output, the demand for 
fossil energy is reduced, resulting in a decline in the EU’s CO2 emissions. 
Now let's look at what happens when there are carbon markets. When enterprises need to undertake 
climate-related costs, economic expansion is partially inhibited, and they need to pay abatement costs. 
When there are separate carbon markets, both China and the EU must meet their own emission caps. 
The international flow of quotas is not allowed. So both China’s and the EU’s CO2 emissions remain 
unchanged. The China’s carbon markets would require China’s enterprises to expand their economies 
while meeting emissions caps, which incur an increased pressure to reduce emissions and a sharp rise in 
quota prices. Meanwhile, to comply with the emission cap while increasing output, enterprises need to 
devote more resources in emission reduction and replace fossil fuels with renewable energy.  
Compared with separate carbon market, China’s output under joint carbon market is more sensitive 
to the positive temporary technology shock, because quotas can be circulated internationally, and 
China’s emission reduction pressures are alleviated by purchasing the EU’s quotas. There is a small 
increase in China’s CO2 emissions under joint emission market, implying that China’s enterprises indeed 
reduce their pressure to reduce emissions by buying the EU’s quotas. As a result, China’s CO2 quota 
prices and abatement cost have not risen as much as they would have done in a separate carbon market. 
The EU’s enterprises are forced to cut CO2 emissions, resulting in an increase in their abatement costs. 
At the same time, higher emission reduction pressure will lead to a decline in demand for fossil fuels 
and a rise in demand for renewable energy. Comparative competitive disadvantage and compressed 
emission space in the EU reinforce the negative effects of its output. As a quota exporter, the euro has 
recovered slightly and trade has improved slightly (compared with BAU). 
Subsidizing renewable energy can boost China’s output. Therefore, whether it is a separate carbon 
market or a joint carbon market, subsidizing renewable energy can bring about higher China’s economic 
expansion effects under positive technology shock, although the differences from non-subsidized 
renewable energy is small. Since the benefits of the carbon market are used to subsidize renewable 
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energy, when the carbon price rises sharply, the development of renewable energy is extremely beneficial. 
Therefore, China’s renewable energy has the greatest expansion effect under the separate carbon market. 
Similarly, the EU’s renewable energy benefits when the carbon prices are pushed up by joint carbon 
market. 
5.2 Subjective shock 
There are two kinds of exogenous uncertainties in household decision-making behaviors, namely 
subjective discount rate and labor supply uncertainties. The former mainly affects the utility function by 
interfering with the time preference, whereas the latter influences the labor supply preference. We now 
focus on the China’s time preference shock. 
============================== 
Figure 5 
============================== 
As displayed in Figure 5, the results of China’s time preference shock were simulated. When the 
expectation of a discount rate of households is increased, macroeconomic variables, such as investment, 
labor, and output, all respond positively. Someone with a high time preference will focus substantially 
on his or her own well-being in the future. Therefore, a higher discount rate means that the preferences 
of households are clearly directed toward the future period. The higher discount rate will also have an 
impact on the intertemporal optimization behaviors of households. The current consumption is replaced 
by inter-temporal investment behavior to ensure a higher level of consumption in the future. Output rises 
rapidly in the early stage of the impact, reaches the bottom after reaching the peak, and then gradually 
rises to steady state. In the early stage, residents prefer working in the current period, thereby increasing 
the labor supply. The positive effects of capital, investment, labor, and other factors will lead to more 
factors available for production, which will consequently result in the increase of total outputs. Then, as 
the discount rate declines, residents gradually increase consumption, which negatively affects 
investment. On the other hand, the increase in emissions from economic expansion has led to a decline 
in the labor efficiency of residents and a decrease in welfare. The economy is gradually cooling down. 
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The relative depreciation of the Euro has reduced the EU’s import demand and expanded demand for 
domestically produced goods. Meanwhile, the EU’s investment was negatively affected, which in turn 
led to a decline in the EU’s labor demand. At last the EU’s output fell slightly. 
We found that China’s carbon price is in line with its output trend. As output rises, the demand for 
emission quotas increases, leading to a rise in the carbon price. The upward pressure on emissions cuts 
and carbon prices has been partially alleviated by internationally tradable quotas. Therefore, the increase 
of China’s carbon price under joint carbon market is milder than separate carbon market. The EU’s quota 
prices rise, and the pressure is transmitted to the production sector, which is ultimately reflected in the 
output. The rise in the EU’s CO2 price under joint carbon market exacerbate the negative effects on its 
output. When output begin to fall, the surplus of quotas supply incurs price declines, and the cost of 
emission reduction also fall. Meanwhile, the EU’s abatement cost and CO2 quota price also decline. The 
drop of China’s CO2 quotas price caused by the quota surplus is partially mitigated in the joint carbon 
market. We noticed a redistribution of CO2 emission permits from China to the EU and a fall in their 
price. The EU’s producers buy emission permits at lower price on the market, and emit more CO2. 
Compared with separate carbon market, in this case, the adjustment of emission reduction cost can 
amplify the decline in permits demand, thereby amplifying the decline in permit prices. This fall in the 
emission permits price under joint carbon market alleviates the negative effects on the EU’s output. 
Recalling the Figure 4, the positive response of both China’s and the EU’s macroeconomic variables 
to expansionary shocks will be amplified by the condition of the absence of climate policies. The 
existence of a carbon market reduces the impact of exogenous shocks on both China’s and the EU’s 
output, investment and consumption etc. Therefore, carbon markets can act as an automatic stabilizer of 
the China’s and the EU’s economy in that they smooth economic fluctuations (Sim, 2006; Annicchiarico 
and Di Dio, 2015). 
5.3 Fiscal policy shock 
There are three kinds of shocks about fiscal policy hitting China’s economy, i.e. public consumption 
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shock, labor and capital tax rate shocks. Since their mechanism of action on the economy is basically 
similar, we only select labor tax rate shock hitting only China to analyze. 
============================== 
Figure 6 
============================== 
As displayed in Figure 6, the results of China’s labor tax rate shock were simulated. A positive labor 
tax rate shock can exert negative effects on labors. Thus, the preferences of households are clearly 
directed toward leisure rather than toward labor supply, which consequently leads to a rapid reduction 
in labor supply. Undoubtedly, household wealth will decrease, followed by a decline in household 
consumption. The demand for labor by enterprises leads to shortages in the labor market, while residents 
demand higher wages to make up for the high labor income tax, consequently increasing the equilibrium 
real wage. The increase in the utility brought about by high wages counteracts the negative effects 
brought about by the aversion to labor, such that the labor supply quickly bounces back. High wages and 
a lack of labor supply in the labor market increase the marginal cost of labor, pushing up the cost of 
production, which leads to a contraction in output and a negative impact on investment. The decline in 
China’s income has led to a decline in demand for all China’s and the EU’s goods through aggregate 
demand channels. The EU’s economies, by contrast, grew slightly at beginning. Subsequently, with the 
slight rebound in China’s market competitiveness, this, coupled with the decline in China’s income 
caused by the shrinking China’s labor and capital markets, have reduced the demand for the EU’s goods, 
which has negatively impacted the EU’s output. The relative increase of the EU’s output leads to the 
increase of income effect of its residents, so residents increase labor supply, which has a slight negative 
impact on its investment. We observed that the response amplitude of macroeconomic variables under 
all shocks is small. This is largely due to the rules of fiscal policy. Recalling Eqs (32), (33) and (34), the 
government uses fiscal policy rules to control government debt and maintain economic stability. 
Consider now the differences in international transmission of business cycle caused by different 
climate policies. As we mentioned in above chapter, the responses of China’s variables in the BAU 
scenario ranked first, followed by that in the joint carbon market and the separate carbon markets 
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scenario (BAU>JE>SE). We also found that the responses of China’s variables in scenario with 
renewable energy subsidy is larger than scenario without renewable energy subsidy (JER>JE and 
SER>SE).  
Then, we focus on the EU. Still, subsidizing renewable energy will amplify the sensitivity of the EU’s 
variables to asymmetric China’s shocks. However, when we look at the response of the EU’s variables 
in the separate carbon market and the joint carbon market, the results are different. Under China’s 
technology shock and labor tax rate shock, the response of the EU’s variables in the joint carbon market 
is more sensitive than separate carbon market. The same results also appear in the case of capital tax rate 
and labor supply shocks (BAU>JE>SE). But, under the impact of China’s time preference shock, the 
situation is just the opposite. The same is true of public spending shock (BAU>SE>JE). 
We found common ground that labor tax rate shock, capital tax rate shock and labor supply shock all 
affect the supply side of economic production (supply-side shock), while time preference shock and 
public spending shock can exert impacts on demand side directly (demand-side shock). Supply-side 
shocks affect the EU’s economy through price and competitive effects. Since the efficiency of price 
transmission in the joint carbon market is higher than that of the separate carbon market, the joint carbon 
market is better able to amplify the supply side impact. However, the demand-side impact affects the 
EU’s economy through the aggregate demand effect, and with the flow of demand, the carbon quota will 
be redistributed under the joint carbon market. Compared with the separate carbon market with fixed 
carbon quota, when the quota flows to the EU, it suffers less pressure from carbon market. Therefore, 
the negative impact of the economy under joint carbon market is smaller than that of the separate carbon 
market. 
5.4 Ramsey climate policy 
In what follows we discuss the strategic interaction of China and EU in climate policies. Here in we 
conduct our research by employing Ramsey optimal policy rule where benevolent China’s and EU’s 
governments maximize the utility of China’s and EU’s household subject to the constraints provided by 
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the equilibrium path and under commitment to this optimal policy. We want to solve the question: what 
is the best strategic interaction between China and the EU under different climate policies? The results 
of adopting a Ramsey approach to climate policy under a China’s technology shock are shown in Figure 
7. We consider three situations, i.e. Both Chinese and EU’s governments treat CO2 emission quota as 
policy instruments to maximize the utility of China’s and EU’s household in separate carbon market 
(SE-all); Only Chinese government treat CO2 emission quota as a policy instrument to maximize the 
utility of China’s household in joint carbon market (JE-China); Both Chinese and EU’s governments 
treat CO2 emission quota as policy instruments to maximize the utility of China’s and EU’s household 
in joint carbon market (JE-all).  
============================== 
Figure 7 
============================== 
In Figure 7(a), it was found that the China’s CO2 emissions cap in separate carbon market should 
respond pro-cyclically to its business cycle. Similar with the results of China’s technology shock, in 
Figure 7(c), we observe that the China’s output is also positively responded. As the Chinese government 
actively adjusts CO2 emission quotas according to the economic cycle, enterprises can emit more CO2 
while the economy is expanding, thus reducing the marginal cost. Therefore, compared with the results 
of China’s technology shock the output expansion is amplified here. Meanwhile, as we mentioned above, 
the EU’s output is negatively affected. The best strategy for the EU is to reversely adjust its CO2 emission 
quotas, rendering it respond pro-cyclically to its own business cycle. That is, in the separate carbon 
market, both China’s and the EU’s CO2 emission quotas should be optimally adjusted pro-cyclically, 
which is consistent with the results of most literatures. 
Then, looking at the Ramsey policy results in joint carbon market. The black and blue line in Figure 
7(a) show that the China’s CO2 emission quota in joint carbon market is also pro-cyclical with its 
business cycle. Now, the black and blue line in Figure 7 (b) show that the best strategy for the EU’s 
government here in joint carbon market is to positively adjust its CO2 emission quota, showing counter-
cyclical to its business cycle. Why is the optimal strategy for the EU completely different under different 
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climate policies? In the joint carbon market, if the EU reduces its carbon quota, the cost of emission 
reduction will rise, and the demand for import quotas will increase, leading to a decline in the 
international competitiveness of products. Therefore, the optimal strategy is to increase the quota, thus 
reducing the demand for import quotas. This result shows that the carbon market is not only affected by 
the business cycle, but also by the international market. The cross-border spillover effects of the joint 
carbon market can change the pro-cyclical characteristics of optimal quotas in the foreign economic 
cycle. The only difference between JE-China and JE-all is whether EU’s governments adjust their 
policies actively or passively. When EU’s government can actively adjust CO2 emission quota, the 
positive adjustment of EU’s CO2 emission quota is larger so that the EU can maximize its social welfare. 
Therefore, compared with JE-China, the increase of China’s output is stronger and the decline of EU’s 
output is milder. 
The dynamic paths of China’s and the EU’s output in joint carbon market are basically similar to the 
situation in separate carbon market. However, the different response amplitude of the economy under 
joint and separate carbon market is evident. The increase of China’s output is stronger and the decline 
of EU’s output is milder than in the case of separate carbon market. This is mainly due to the increase 
in China’s and the EU’s CO2 quotas and the perfect circulation of quotas in the international market can 
lead to a sharp drop in carbon price, further reducing the marginal cost of China’s and the EU’s 
production. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we established an open economy E-DSGE model in order to study the international 
climate action under dynamic international economic cycles for two fully interdependent economies 
complete with various uncertainties. The model used China and EU as real cases for analyzing three 
questions raised at the beginning of the paper.  
From the perspective of long term equilibrium, we analyzed how China’s and the EU’s economic 
behaviors and international trade interacted with the international carbon market. There is no doubt that 
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the carbon markets will constrain the economic level of China and the EU, but they will bring about 
environmental improvements as well, while the income utilized from carbon quota auctions to subsidize 
renewable energy innovations can offset some negative effects caused by carbon markets. We also 
simulated the marginal abatement cost curves of China and EU, proving that, due to deadweight loss, 
the efficiency of the separate carbon market is lower than that of the joint carbon market. The high 
efficiency of the joint carbon market was due to the fact that it could automatically reallocate national 
emission reduction tasks to minimize abatement costs. We furthermore simulate the optimal allocation 
of emission reductions ratio between China and the EU. The results indicate that while China needs to 
undertake more emission reductions in the optimal portfolio, however, it needs to undertake only a 
slightly larger share of the emission reduction than the EU. 
When studying how economic uncertainty spreads through international trade and carbon markets, 
we consider the different asymmetric shocks hitting China exclusively. The existence of the carbon 
market makes China less sensitive to external shocks; as a result, the carbon market can be an automatic 
stabilizer in that it is able to smooth economic fluctuations. Different climate policies can also lead to 
different business cycles in China. Compared with the separate carbon market, where CO2 quotas can 
be circulated internationally, the Chinese economy under the joint carbon market is more sensitive to 
stochastic shocks. The spillover effects of asymmetric shocks are transmitted to the EU’s economy 
through two channels: the aggregate demand effect, and the competitive effect. The intensity of the 
spillover effects caused by asymmetric shocks depends not only on the nature of them, but also on 
different climate policies. Regarding supply-side shocks, the EU’s economy in the joint carbon market 
is more sensitive than the separate carbon market, as the joint carbon market brings more cross-border 
pressures and enhances cross-border spillovers. However, under the separate carbon market, demand-
side shocks have a stronger impact on the EU than the joint carbon market. The results are mainly due 
to the fact that supply-side shocks affect the EU’s economy through price and competitive effects, 
whereas demand-side shocks are transmitted through aggregate demand effects. Since the efficiency of 
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price transmission in the joint carbon market is higher than that of the separate carbon market, the joint 
carbon market is better able to amplify the supply-side shocks. 
Lastly, we used the Ramsey optimal policy rule to study the optimal strategic interactions of climate 
policies in China and the EU under asymmetric shocks, finding out that China's and the EU's CO2 
emission quotas should be adjusted pro-cyclically to business cycles in separate carbon markets. In a 
joint carbon market, the Chinese government should also adjust CO2 emission quotas pro-cyclically with 
its business cycle. The best strategy for the EU's government here, however, is to adjust its CO2 emission 
quotas counter-cyclically with its business cycle. The results indicate that carbon markets are affected 
not only by business cycles but also international markets. The cross-border spillover effects of the joint 
carbon market can change the pro-cyclical characteristics of foreign (EU’s) optimal quotas. 
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Figure 1. The framework of open economy environmental DSGE model 
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Figure 2. The framework of the intermediate goods producers’ production 
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(a) The EU’s marginal abatement cost curve        (b) China’s marginal abatement cost curve 
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(c) China’s and the EU’s marginal abatement costs 
 
(d) The optimal allocation of emission reduction ratios between China and the EU 
Figure 3. The marginal abatement costs and optimal allocation of emission reduction ratios 
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Figure 4. The responses to a transitory technology shock hitting only China 
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Figure 5. The responses to a transitory time preference shock hitting only China 
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Figure 6. The responses to a transitory labor tax rate shock hitting only China 
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(a) China’s CO2 quota                    (b) the EU’s CO2 quota 
 
(c) China’s output                          (d) the EU’s output 
Figure 7. The results of Ramsey environmental policy under a China’s technology shock 
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Tables 
Table 1. The parameters and values 
No. Parameter Value Description 
(1)   0.95 Discount factor 
(2) 1θ  2 Relative risk aversion 
(3) 2θ  1 Elasticity of labor supply 
(4) H  0.6 The weight of environmental quality 
(5)   2 Investment adjustment cost parameter 
(6) tp  6.9°C Disaster temperature rise 
(7) χ  0.35 Environment quality parameter 
(8) 3  3.42 Real money balances elasticity 
(9)   1.372 Elasticity of substitution across consumption 
(10)   0.75 The ratio of domestic products to domestic demand 
(11)   0.8976 Elasticity of CER production 
(12) 
Mμ  2.7716 
Emission coefficient of coal, oil and natural gas (kg/tce) Oμ  
2.0306 
NGμ  1.6438 
(13) 
  100 Parameter for innovation efficiency 
1d  
1.2 The efficiency of government supports on the innovation level 

 
1.1 Exponent parameter for innovation level 
(14) 
OΛ  
-460.8 (China) 
-802.5 (EU) 
Emission reduction cost parameter NGΛ  
-486.08 (China) 
-878.35 (EU) 
MΛ  
-80.152 (China) 
-189.77 (EU) 
(15) 
0  1.3950e-3 
Labor efficiency parameters 1  -6.6722e-6 
2  1.4647e-8 
(1). Fischer and Springborn (2011):0.95; Andrés et al., (2013): 0.95; 
(2). Stern (2008): 2; Weitzman (2007): 2; Angelopoulos et al., (2010): 2; Acemoglu et al., (2012). 2; 
(3). Gerali et al., (2010): 1; Yang and Liu, (2014): 1; 
(4). Angelopoulos et al., (2010): 0.6; Yang and Liu, (2014):0.6; 
(5). Burnside et al., (2003): 2;  
(6). According to Acemoglu et al., (2012). 6.9°C corresponds to 1.5 times the highest estimate of the temperature 
increase that would eventually lead to the melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet (Pachauri and Reisinger, 2007); 
(7). Acemoglu et al., (2012): 0.3492; Wu et al., (2014): 0.3501; 
(8). Neiss and Pappa (2005): 3.42; 
(9). Liu (2013): 1.372; Adolfson et al., (2007): 1.468; 
(10). Liu (2013): 0.75; Adolfson et al., (2007): 0.69; 
(11). Wu et al., (2014) used Bayesian estimation to estimate the elasticity of CER after establishing carbon market. 
(12). Emission coefficients of coal, oil and natural gas are calibrated by Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories (IPCC) 
(13). Fanti and Gori, (2010): 0   for a “S” shape curve. 1   for a “S” shape curve. When 0tTr  , the level of 
innovation is 1 and when 
tTr  , the level of innovation is 1.2.  
35 
(14). Estimated by authors. Our CGE model was used to estimate marginal abatement cost of CO2 in China and EU. 
We performed a sequence of carbon tax rates. We thereby generated the sequence of marginal abatement costs, 
i.e., carbon tax rates, and the associated emissions reductions.  
(15). Labor efficiency parameters are calibrated by Annicchiarico and Di Dio (2015) 
 
Table 2. The results of mix frequency Bayesian estimation 
Parameters 
Prior 
mean 
Posterior 
mean 
90% high posterior 
density interval 
Prior 
distribution 
Prior standard 
deviation 
China 
A  0.8 0.9147 0.9074 0.9226 Beta 0.1 
K  0.8 0.7881 0.7208 0.8552 Beta 0.1 
L  0.8 0.7131 0.5893 0.8285 Beta 0.1 
G  0.8 0.7381 0.6698 0.7995 Beta 0.1 
s
  0.8 0.6967 0.6219 0.767 Beta 0.1 
Ls
  0.8 0.7802 0.6564 0.8729 Beta 0.1 
K
G  0.05 0.0495 0.0184 0.085 Inverse gamma 0.05 
L
G  0.05 0.0566 0.0173 0.1092 Inverse gamma 0.05 
K
Y  0.05 0.0426 0.0165 0.0721 Inverse gamma 0.05 
L
Y  0.05 0.0462 0.017 0.0756 Inverse gamma 0.05 
G
B  0.05 0.0586 0.0466 0.0732 Inverse gamma 0.05 
G
Y  0.05 0.0332 0.016 0.0507 Inverse gamma 0.05 
The EU 
*
A  0.8 0.8023 0.7312 0.8726 Beta 0.1 
*
K  0.8 0.6434 0.5044 0.8114 Beta 0.1 
*
L  0.8 0.6602 0.5623 0.7834 Beta 0.1 
*
G  0.8 0.6342 0.4004 0.8218 Beta 0.1 
*
s
  0.8 0.6183 0.527 0.6998 Beta 0.1 
*
Ls
  0.8 0.7945 0.705 0.8949 Beta 0.1 
*K
G  0.05 0.0519 0.0195 0.0885 Inverse gamma 0.05 
*L
G  0.05 0.0465 0.0171 0.0812 Inverse gamma 0.05 
*K
Y  0.05 0.0346 0.0175 0.0532 Inverse gamma 0.05 
*L
Y  0.05 0.0467 0.0188 0.0804 Inverse gamma 0.05 
*G
B  0.05 0.0604 0.0407 0.0809 Inverse gamma 0.05 
*G
Y  0.05 0.0666 0.0181 0.1222 Inverse gamma 0.05 
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Table 3. The steady-state values of the main variables in China and the EU 
 BAU SE SER JE JER 
tY  1.0381 1.0291 -0.87% 1.0295 -0.83% 1.0195 -1.79% 1.0200 -1.74% 
tC  0.5650 0.5601 -0.86% 0.5603 -0.83% 0.5571 -1.40% 0.5573 -1.36% 
2CO
tE  0.3752 0.3377 -10.00% 0.3377 -10.00% 0.3168 -15.55% 0.3168 -15.57% 
tNE  0.0020 0.0045 126.35% 0.0051 160.70% 0.0033 67.58% 0.0041 106.95% 
tM  0.0890 0.0796 -10.54% 0.0796 -10.53% 0.0744 -16.38% 0.0744 -16.38% 
tO  0.0585 0.0532 -9.14% 0.0531 -9.15% 0.0502 -14.26% 0.0501 -14.29% 
tNG  0.0060 0.0056 -6.13% 0.0056 -6.19% 0.0054 -9.58% 0.0054 -9.67% 
2CO
tP  0.0000 0.0213 / 0.0209 / 0.0362 / 0.0357 / 
tTI  1.0000 1.0000 0.00% 1.0828 8.28% 1.0000 0.00% 1.1062 10.62% 
L
t  0.9774 0.9790 0.16% 0.9790 0.16% 0.9790 0.16% 0.9790 0.16% 
tCER  0.0000 0.0055 / 0.0055 / 0.0055 / 0.0055 / 
*
tY  1.0798 1.0633 -1.53% 1.0635 -1.52% 1.0777 -0.20% 1.0778 -0.20% 
*
tC  1.2779 1.2628 -1.19% 1.2631 -1.16% 1.2703 -0.60% 1.2705 -0.58% 
2*CO
tE  0.1092 0.0731 -33.00% 0.0731 -33.00% 0.0940 -13.91% 0.0940 -13.85% 
*
tNE  0.0023 0.0037 62.83% 0.0040 76.08% 0.0027 21.19% 0.0029 25.82% 
*
tM  0.0074 0.0057 -23.01% 0.0057 -23.08% 0.0067 -8.68% 0.0067 -8.68% 
*
tO  0.0218 0.0148 -32.02% 0.0148 -32.03% 0.0189 -13.24% 0.0189 -13.18% 
*
tNG  0.0271 0.0166 -38.50% 0.0167 -38.46% 0.0225 -16.95% 0.0225 -16.86% 
2*CO
tP  0.0000 0.0288 / 0.0286 / 0.0097 / 0.0096 / 
*
tTI  1.0000 1.0000 0.00% 1.0346 3.46% 1.0000 0.00% 1.0165 1.65% 
tS  3.6911 3.6719 -0.52% 3.6713 -0.54% 3.7393 1.31% 3.7378 1.27% 
2,CO tC  404.0 389.3 -3.64% 389.3 -3.64% 389.3 -3.64% 389.3 -3.64% 
tTW  -54.2765 -54.5061 -0.42% -54.5067 -0.42% -54.4997 -0.41% -54.4968 -0.41% 
tTY
(2) 2.1179 2.0923 -1.21% 2.0929 -1.18% 2.0972 -0.98% 2.0977 -0.95% 
(1) tY  and 
*
tY  are real output in China and the EU. 
*
t t tTY Y Y   is the total real output. 
(2) tTW  is the total welfare in China and the EU. 
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Appendix A. The Model Derivation 
A.1 Household 
To solve the household problem, the Langrangian function was formed:  
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F.O.C. for the household’s problem:  
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A.2 Enterprises 
A.2.1 Final goods producers 
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F.O.C. for the final goods producer’s problem: 
( ) ( )t t t tY j P j Y P
                                 (A.10) 
We presume that the final goods are in a perfect competitive and free entry market, which implies the 
zero profit of the final goods producer, that is, 
1
0
( ) ( )t t t tY j P j dj Y P . The general price level in the 
product market is obtained by the zero profit condition 
1
1 1
0
( )t tP P j dj
     . 
A.2.2 Intermediate goods producers 
The intermediate goods producing firm’s problem can be written as follows: 
1 1 1 1
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F.O.C. for the intermediate goods producing firm’s problem 
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The energy producing firm’s problem can be written as follows: 
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F.O.C. for the energy producing firm’s problem 
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The fossil energy producing firm’s problem can be written as follows: 
2 2 2 2
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F.O.C. for the fossil energy producing firm’s problem 
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The renewable energy producing firm’s problem can be written as follows: 
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F.O.C. for the renewable energy producing firm’s problem 
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The coal, oil and natural gas producing firm’s problem can be written as follows: 
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F.O.C. for the coal, oil and natural gas producing firm’s problem 
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Following Calvo (1983), firms that have the chance to change their prices to maximise the expected 
sum of discounted future real profits.  
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F.O.C for Calvo pricing: 
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Following the Calvo (1983), the price dispersion function can be rewritten as Eq. (A.31) (A.32): 
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A.3 Market clearing 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y NE NG M Ot t t t t tL j L j L j L j L j L j                   (A.50) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y NE NG M Ot t t t t tK j K j K j K j K j K j                  (A.51) 
In equilibrium and markets clearing, the following conditions are satisfied in all of society, that is, 
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Finally, the resource constraint of the domestic and foreign economy can be given as: 
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